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Victims’ rights are human rights:  
The importance of recognizing victims as persons
jo-an n e  we M M e r s *
I
n this paper the author argues that victims’ rights are human rights. Criminal law 
typically views victims as witnesses to a crime against the state, thus shutting them 
out of the criminal justice process and only allowing them in when they are needed to 
testify. This is a major source of dissatisfaction for victims who seek validation in the 
criminal justice system. Victims are persons with rights and privileges. Crimes constitute  
violations of their rights as well as acts against society or the state. While human rights 
instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, do not mention crime 
victims specifically, a number of rights are identified, which can be viewed from the 
victim’s perspective. As individuals with dignity, victims have the right to recognition as 
persons before the law. However, such rights are only meaningful if they can be enforced.
Keywords: victims of crime, human rights, victims’ rights, criminal justice.
Introduction
The last fifty years have witnessed the birth of victimology and the 
victims’ movement. At both the international and national level, various legal 
instruments have been developed in order to improve the plight of victims in 
the criminal justice system. The United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the 
European Union, are just a few examples of organizations that have adopted 
victims’ rights instruments. Even the newly established International Criminal 
Court includes rights for victims. Domestically, countries like Canada and the 
United States have adopted victims’ rights legislation.
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Yet, despite international and national developments, victims continue 
to  feel  shut  out  of  the  criminal  justice  system  (Brienen,  Hoegen,  2000; 
Young 2005; Wemmers, Cyr, 2006; Davis, Mulford, 2008). Criminal law, and in 
particular the common-law legal tradition, views victims primarily as witnesses 
to a crime against the state. As a result, victims are treated as objects and 
used by legal actors in order to advance their case. The absence of any role for 
victims in the criminal justice system, other than that of witness, is often seen 
as the root of victims’ frustration with criminal justice and an important source 
of secondary victimization (Baril, Durand, Cousineau, Gravel, 1985; Shapland, 
1985; Wemmers, Cyr, 2004; Cyr, 2008; Van Camp, Wemmers, 2011).
In this paper we will argue that victims’ rights are human rights and that 
crime constitutes a violation of their rights as well as an act against the state 
and, in turn, that victims require recognition as persons before the law. Firstly, 
we need to understand what human rights are. Secondly, we will examine the 
rights contained in human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and discuss why victims are not explicitly included in them. 
This is followed by an examination of victims’ rights instruments and their 
application. Throughout this paper, the Canadian situation is used as an 
example, to illustrate the arguments put forth by the author.
Rights and Human Rights
The word “right” has several different meanings. It has a moral and a 
political meaning: rectitude and entitlement (Donnelly, 2003). In the context 
of the present paper, we are especially concerned with rights in the sense of 
entitlement or something that one may do. We typically speak of someone 
having a right. For example, a person has the right to freedom of speech. 
But more than just the ability to act, rights are enforceable. They bring with 
them an obligation to respect a person’s right. For example, we are obliged 
to respect someone’s freedom of speech even if we do not agree with what 
they are saying. We can, however, impose limitations on rights. Rights are not 
endless. Generally it is accepted that one person’s rights stop where another 
person’s rights begin (Baril, 1985). To continue with the same example, a 
person has the right to freedom of speech but they cannot abuse that right in 
order to transmit messages that are racist or sexist.Temida
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Human rights are basic rights, which it is generally considered all people 
should have and without which we would be unable to live as humans and 
develop to our full potential. Human rights have four major characteristics: 
universal; inherent; indivisible; and inalienable (Donnelly, 2003). Universal 
means that they apply to human beings everywhere. Inherent are intrinsic 
to being human and do not rely on codification or some other external 
validation to exist. Indivisible means that these rights are interdependent and 
interrelated and therefore one cannot prioritize one right without affecting 
other rights. Inalienable means that no one can ever take away these rights.
Past abuses of power have led to the development of human rights 
instruments in order to protect the rights of individuals and groups. An 
important  development  was  the  creation  of  the  Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. Following the horrors of the Nazi Regime 
(1939-1945) the international community pulled together to create the United 
Nations (UN). As one of its first tasks, the UN created the Commission on 
Human Rights, which wrote the UDHR. As Ignatieff (2001) writes, the UDHR 
is not about Western moral superiority, but a warning by Europeans not to 
reproduce their mistakes and abandon individualism to collectivism. The core 
of the Declaration is moral individualism and respect for human dignity. It 
attempts to protect individual agency against the totalitarian state.
The UDHR contains some thirty rights in all. Although neither the word 
victim  nor  offender  appears  in  it,  several  articles  do  refer  to  “everyone 
charged with a penal offence.” The rights of the accused include the right 
to be presumed innocent, right to a fair trial, freedom from torture and the 
right to not be arrested or detained arbitrarily. As a declaration, the UDHR is a 
non-binding document. It was conceived of as a statement of objectives to be 
pursued by governments.
In addition to international law, many national governments have their 
own charter of rights, which is legally binding. For example, in Canada, the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) outlines the rights of Canadians. The 
Charter is divided into sections and includes a section titled “legal rights.” 
Like the UDHR, victims’ rights are not included in the Charter but the rights of 
the accused are. The legal rights of Canadians ensure that they are protected 
against unreasonable search or seizure, they have the right to not be arbitrarily 
detained or imprisoned and the right to not be subject to cruel and unusual 
punishment. Upon detention they have the right to information, counsel 
and to have the validity of their detention tested. In criminal proceedings, Jo-Anne Wemmers
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the accused has a number of rights including the right to information, to be 
presumed innocent and the right to a fair and timely trial. These rights reflect 
the spirit of the UDHR and place respect for the dignity of the individual before 
the interest of the state. Furthermore, individuals who feel that their Charter 
rights were not respected can seek recourse before the courts (Art. 24).
Why not victims?
It may seem odd that human rights instruments would include extensive 
rights  for  those  accused  of  having  committed  crimes  but  not  mention 
victims of crime. After all, victims are human too. In order to understand this 
apparent imbalance, it is important to recall the history of criminal law. Civil 
law predates criminal law. Early legal systems dealt with conflicts between 
citizens. The victimologist, Stephen Schafer (1968), refers to this period as 
the “golden age” for victims. It was not until the Middle Ages that, in Anglo-
Saxon  England,  offences  came  to  be  viewed  as  acts  against  ‘the  King’s 
peace’ or the state. Gradually, over time, criminal law evolved and the state 
replaced the victim in the legal process (Viau, 1996; Wemmers, 2003; Young, 
2005: Doak, 2008). The result of this transformation is that today the criminal 
justice process in common-law systems is founded on the state laying charges 
against the accused. Victims are witnesses to crimes against the state.
Once the state ousted victims from the criminal justice process, there 
was an imbalance of power between the omnipotent state and the individual 
accused of a crime (Kirchengast, 2006; Doak, 2008). Abuses of power by tyrant 
kings led to calls from scholars such as Montesquieu and Beccaria (1765) for 
the introduction of limitations on the power of the state and the creation of 
rights for the accused. Today the rights of the accused are well entrenched 
in law. In this context, victims did not need rights because their freedom was 
not at stake.
Modern criminal proceedings focus on the accusations brought by the 
state against the accused. There are three major actors involved: the judge, 
the prosecutor (who represents the state) and the accused or their legal 
representative.  Of  course,  many  different  criminal  justice  systems  exist. 
While a complete discussion of the various legal traditions goes beyond 
the scope of this paper, it is important to note that across legal traditions, 
the focus of the trial is on proving the guilt of the accused. In common-law Temida
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countries, which have an adversarial system, there are only two parties: the 
state and the accused. It is the state’s job to prove that the accused is guilty 
and the defence’s job to show reasonable doubt. For example, in Canada, 
victims’ involvement in the criminal justice process is completely up to the 
prosecution and the defence. If either thinks that it is important that the 
victim testify, the victim will be subpoenaed (i.e. ordered) to do so. However, 
if the case does not go to court, for example because it is plea-bargained, or 
if the victim is simply not required to testify, then the victim will essentially be 
shut out of the criminal justice process.
This brings us to the core issue: victims are witnesses to a crime against 
the state. If crimes truly were directed at the state and were not committed 
against individuals, then this dual-party configuration would make sense. 
However, in reality, crimes are committed against individuals. And these 
individuals – the victims of crime – seek recognition of the crimes committed 
against them. Victims, who once had a place in laying charges against the 
accused, have been completely pushed out and replaced by the state (Schafer, 
1968; Kirchengast, 2006). They have been rendered powerless against an 
omnipotent state that has the power to force them to testify as well as the 
power to shut them out.
Victims’ Rights
Rights empower the powerless. In order to improve the plight of victims 
of crime, in 1985, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, which includes a 
number of rights for victims. In the preamble to the Declaration, the General 
Assembly acknowledges that the rights of victims have not been adequately 
recognized. According to the Declaration, its aim is “to assist Governments 
and  the  international  community  in  their  efforts  to  secure  justice  and 
assistance for victims of crime and victims of abuse of power.”
The Declaration provides victims with the right to be treated with 
respect and recognition. It recognizes that victims sometimes need support 
in order to deal with the impact of crime and it gives them the right to be 
referred to adequate support services. They will often not be familiar with 
the criminal justice system and how it works and, therefore, the Declaration 
gives victims the right to receive information about the criminal justice Jo-Anne Wemmers
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system and their role in it. Victims view the crime as “their” victimization 
(Shapland, Wilmore, Duff, 1985) and the Declaration recognizes victims’ 
right to receive notification about the progress of the case. It also provides 
victims with the right express their views and concerns at appropriate 
stages in the criminal justice process. The Declaration recognizes victims’ 
right to protection of their physical safety and of their privacy. Finally, the 
Declaration acknowledges victims right to reparation from the offender as 
well as compensation from the state.
However, the Declaration is non-binding. It is what is referred to as ‘soft 
law.’ It is an attempt to guide governments. There are no consequences for a 
government that chooses not to follow some or all of the rights included in 
the Declaration. In addition, the Declaration is not very specific. In order to 
accommodate the differences across legal systems, it is written in very abstract 
and general terms. This gives states a lot of latitude when interpreting it.
The application of the Declaration in Member States has proven to be 
problematic. In 1995, ten years after the adoption of the Declaration, the UN 
conducted a survey among its members to assess the implementation of the 
Declaration. The results showed that very few countries had modified their 
criminal justice system in accordance with the Declaration (Groenhuijsen, 
1999). Similar findings are reported by Brienen and Hoegen (2000) in their 
survey of victims’ rights in 22 European countries.
In Canada, which played a lead role in the creation of the Declaration 
and its adoption there were some changes after 1985. To begin with, in 1988, 
the Canadian Criminal Code was modified in order to permit victims to make 
Victim Impact Statements. With this change the word ‘victim’ was introduced 
into  the  Criminal  Code  for  the  first  time.  The  Victim  Impact  Statement 
allows victims to make a written statement about the impact that the crime 
had on them and submit it to the court at the sentencing hearing after the 
accused has been found guilty. Since 2000, victims can read their statement 
aloud in court. Also in 1988, the Federal-Provincial-Territorial Working Group 
published its Statement of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime. As its 
title suggests, the contents of this Statement strongly reflect that of the UN 
Declaration. Many articles are identical to that found in the UN Declaration 
and, like the Declaration, the Canadian Statement is non-binding.
The administration of justice in Canada is under provincial jurisdiction. 
Hence, following the UN Declaration several provinces introduced their own 
Bill of Rights for victims. In the province of Quebec a victims’ Bill of Rights Temida
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was adopted in 1988. Once again, this law was strongly inspired by the UN 
Declaration and uses much the same wording. For example, victims have the 
right to “express their views and concerns at appropriate stages of the criminal 
justice procedure, when their personal interests are concerned” (art. 3). This 
raises the question, what are appropriate stages for victim intervention? As 
was mentioned earlier, the UN Declaration is purposely abstract and general 
in order to accommodate the many different criminal justice systems found 
among the Member States. There is no need to remain abstract when adapting 
the Declaration to domestic law. There is only one criminal justice system 
in the province and in fact, only one criminal code for the whole of Canada. 
On the contrary, one needs to be concrete and specify who is responsible 
for what (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000). By copying the wording used in the UN 
Declaration, victims’ rights in Quebec are needlessly vague. Furthermore, 
like the Declaration, the rights contained in the Quebec legislation are non-
enforceable. That is, nowhere does the law specify enforcement measures and 
victims’ recourse when their rights are not respected.
This problem is well illustrated in the case of Vanscoy and Even, two 
victims of violent crime in the Canadian province of Ontario, who hired a 
lawyer to represent them as they pursued the State for its failure to respect 
their rights as outlined in the province’s Victims’ Bill of Rights (Vanscoy 
and Even v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, [1999] O.J. No.1661 
(OntSupCtJus). The victims argued that their rights had been violated because 
they were not notified of pending court dates and not consulted with respect 
to plea resolution agreements. The judge stated:
I conclude that the legislature did not intend for s. 2(1) of the Victims’ Bill of 
Rights to provide rights to the victims of crime… The Act articulates a number 
of principles, whose strength is limited not only by precatory language, but 
also by a myriad of other factors falling within the broad rubrics of availability 
of resources, reasonableness in the circumstances, consistency with the law 
and public interest, and the need to ensure a speedy resolution of the procee-
dings. Finally, even if there was an indefensible breach of these principles, the 
legislation expressly precludes any remedy for the alleged wrong. While the 
Applicants may be disappointed by the legislature’s efforts, they have no claim 
before the courts because of it. (Vanscoy and Even v. Her Majesty the Queen in 
Right of Ontario, [1999] O.J. No. 1661 (OntSupCtJus))Jo-Anne Wemmers
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The  only  province  in  Canada  to  provide  victims  with  something 
more  than  vague  rights  is  Manitoba.  In  2011,  the  province  introduced 
comprehensive  victims  legislation,  which  replaced  the  prior  legislation 
concerning victims’ rights and compensation. The new legislation describes 
in detail the responsibilities of law enforcement authorities as well as the 
prosecution and the court administration towards victims. In addition, the 
law includes a complaints procedure for victims. Victims in Manitoba who 
feel that their rights have not been respected can make a complaint to the 
province’s director of Victims’ services. While this is clearly an improvement 
compared to other provinces, it still does not provide legal remedy to victims. 
By providing victims with a complaints procedure the Manitoba government 
recognizes that victims’ rights should be respected. However, it fails to view 
victims as persons before the law with enforceable rights and privileges and 
give them legal recourse.
Crime as a Violation of Victims’ Rights
While  victims  are  sensitive  to  the  public  interest  in  crime,  in  their 
view  crime  is  an  offence  against  society  as  well  as  offence  against  the 
individual victim (Wemmers, Cyr, 2004). They do not understand why the 
state does not recognize them in any role other than as witnesses. The 
fundamental difference between a tort and a crime is not that crimes do 
not affect individual victims but rather that a tort is private and does not 
include the state while a crime affects society as well. As Doak points out, 
“What constitutes a ‘crime’ as opposed to a ‘tort’ is purely dependent upon 
how crime is defined within any given society” (2008: 27). It is a subjective 
judgement by the victim who defines the act as a crime and reports it to 
the police. Hence, when the criminal justice system views the victim as a 
witness to a crime against the state this is fundamentally opposed to victims’ 
perspective and, inevitably, they will be disappointed.
The notion of looking at victims through the lens of human rights is not 
entirely new. As early as 1985, Robert Elias argued for a “victimology of human 
rights.” Elias warned that victimologists risked becoming pawns of abusive 
governments if they limit their object of study to victims of crime. Instead, 
he argued, victimologists should study all man-made victimizations, which 
includes crimes as well as gross violations of human rights such as genocide, Temida
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torture and slavery. Hence, while Elias proposed that human rights violations 
should be included in the field of victimology, he did not see crime as a 
violation of the victims’ rights.
Previous work linking victims’ rights to human rights can be found in 
the work of legal scholars such as Sam Garkawe and Jonathan Doak. Sam 
Garkawe, argues that the poor treatment of victims should be viewed as a 
matter of human rights protection. To this end, he proposes the creation 
of a UN Convention on Victims’ Rights (2005). Following the structure of 
international lawmaking and human rights, a Convention would include 
some kind of monitoring mechanism. The idea of developing a Convention 
was supported by the World Society of Victimology and the University of 
Tilburg, which organized a series of expert-meetings and developed a Draft 
Convention1 (Van Genugten, Van Gestel, Groenhuijsen, Letschert, 2007). In his 
book, Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice, Doak (2008), claims 
that the European Convention of Human Rights has encouraged domestic 
policy-makers and the courts to view victims’ rights as a form of human rights. 
Concretely, the introduction of the Human Rights Act in the UK, which offers 
victims of Convention violations recourse in domestic (UK) courts, has meant 
that ‘public bodies’ such as the police, the prosecution and other criminal 
justice organisations are under duty to act in accordance with the Convention 
and respect the human rights of crime victims.
Recently,  there  has  been  significant  progress  in  the  recognition  of 
crimes as violations of victims’ rights in the European Union. In a proposed 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European 
Union (2011) introducing minimum standards for victims of crime, crimes 
are explicitly considered “an offence against society as well as a violation of 
the individual rights of victims” (Art. 5, emphasis added). This is a huge step 
forward. In the 2001 Council Framework Decision on the standing of victims in 
criminal proceedings, which the minimum standards will replace, crime was 
not explicitly defined as a violation of the victims’ rights. Instead, states were 
merely encouraged to recognize victims’ “legitimate interest” in proceedings. 
The proposed Directive aims to ensure that the specific needs of victims are 
taken into account during criminal proceedings, regardless of the nature of 
the offence or where it took place within the European Union (EU).
1  For  more  about  the  Draft  Convention  see:  http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/
institutes-and-research-groups/intervict/undeclaration/Jo-Anne Wemmers
80
Using the human rights framework, we can identify specific substantive 
rights that apply to victims as well as procedural rights. Regarding substantive 
rights, crime can be viewed as a violation of the victims’ right to life, liberty 
and security of person (UDHR, Art. 3) or their right to property (UDHR, Art 
17). To treat victims with dignity and respect (UN Declaration, Art. 1) an 
individual must first be recognized as a moral and legal person. In turn, this 
requires certain basic personal rights such as the right to recognition before 
the law (Donnelly, 2003). Article 6 of the UDHR states: “Everyone has the right 
to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.” This gives rise to the 
notion of victim participation and procedural rights for victims. It suggests 
that victims must not be treated as mere evidence, but they must be regarded 
as subjects with personal, individual and independent standing at the criminal 
trial (Walther, 2011).
Victims’ rights, like human rights, are only meaningful if they confer 
entitlements as well as obligations on people. Otherwise, they are not rights 
and they will ultimately fail to empower victims. Legal protection of rights is 
necessary in order to defend victims’ rights (Kilpatrick, Beatty, Smith Howley, 
1998). It is the ability to exercise our rights, using our free will and rational 
choice, which gives meaning to the notion of ‘human dignity.’ Without this 
ability, victims will remain voiceless objects of the criminal justice system who 
are forced to forfeit their individual human rights in the interest of the society.
Conclusion
The monopoly of power of the state in the criminal justice process has 
silenced victims, rendering them mere witnesses to a crime against the 
state. This approach fails to recognize the reality of victims: They directly 
experienced the crime and, as such, it constitutes a violation of their human 
rights. The victims’ movement has introduced victims’ rights in an effort to 
improve the plight of victims. However, up until now it has stopped short of 
viewing them as human rights. It is time to move victims’ rights to the next 
level. We need to acknowledge the victim as a person before the law with 
rights and privileges.Temida
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Prava žrtava su ljudska prava:  
značaj prepoznavanja žrtava kao ličnosti
Autorka u ovom članku tvrdi da su prava žrtava ljudska prava. Krivični zakon 
obično vidi žrtve kao svedoke zločina protv države i tako ih isključuje iz procesa 
krivičnog pravosuđa osim u slučajevima kada su potrebni kao svedoci. Ovo je glavni 
uzrok nezadovoljstva žrtava koje traže potvrdu u sistemu krivičnog pravosuđa. Žrtve 
su ličnosti sa pravima i privilegijama. Krivična dela čine povredu njihovih prava kao 
i čin usmeren protiv društva ili države. Dok instrumenti ljudskih prava kao što su 
Univerzalna deklaracija o ljudskim pravima posebno ne pominju žrtve zločina, oni 
identifikuju jedan broj ljudskih prava koja su vidljiva iz perspektive žrtve. Kao individue 
koje imaju dostojanstvo, žrtve imaju pravo da pred zakonom budu prepoznate kao 
ličnosti. Ipak, ova prava imaju smisla jedino ako se mogu sprovesti u praksi.
Ključne reči: žrtve, ljudska prava, prava žrtava, krivično pravosuđe.